Non-Individuals
1 : Department of Philosophy, Durham University
* : Corresponding author
An individual, as this term will be understood here, is an entity that possesses both
unity and determinate identity. That is to say, an entity x is an individual just in case
(1) x is unambiguously one entity — a ‘unit' — of its kind and (2) x is such that there
is a determinate fact of the matter as to which entity of its kind x is. As a consequence
of (2), if x is an individual, then it is always determinate, for any given entity y of x's
kind, whether or not x is identical with y. It will be observed that this characterization
of individuality — which, I would urge, is fully consonant with metaphysical tradition
ever since its roots in antiquity — implies that any individual must be an individual of
some kind: there are and can be no ‘bare' individuals.
It is important not to confuse or conflate the notion of an individual with that of a
particular, where the latter is contrasted with a universal. Universals, including kinds
or (at least in one sense of the term) species, are eligible to be regarded as individuals,
quite as much as particulars are. Furthermore, it would be a mistake to suppose that
all individuals are necessarily concrete entities, as opposed to abstract ones. Certain
mathematical entities, for instance, can be regarded as individuals. Consequently,
spatiotemporal and causal characterizations of individuality are inadequate, since they
lack the generality required to capture this notion.
Many philosophers assume, explicitly or implicitly, that all entities are individuals in
the foregoing sense, and indeed that it is a necessary truth that they are. But this can
certainly be disputed. It is, very arguably, both logically and metaphysically possible
for there to be non-individuals, that is, entities which fail to satisfy either clause (1) or
clause (2) — or both — of the foregoing definition of an ‘individual'. The aim of this
paper will be to clarify the notion of a non-individual, propose a typology of nonindividuals,
and illustrate the notion's potential for application within and across the
sciences, by means of putative examples. This is an enterprise in which analytic
metaphysics and theoretical science can, it is to be hoped, cooperate fruitfully and
without mutual hostility or rivalry, to the benefit of both.
unity and determinate identity. That is to say, an entity x is an individual just in case
(1) x is unambiguously one entity — a ‘unit' — of its kind and (2) x is such that there
is a determinate fact of the matter as to which entity of its kind x is. As a consequence
of (2), if x is an individual, then it is always determinate, for any given entity y of x's
kind, whether or not x is identical with y. It will be observed that this characterization
of individuality — which, I would urge, is fully consonant with metaphysical tradition
ever since its roots in antiquity — implies that any individual must be an individual of
some kind: there are and can be no ‘bare' individuals.
It is important not to confuse or conflate the notion of an individual with that of a
particular, where the latter is contrasted with a universal. Universals, including kinds
or (at least in one sense of the term) species, are eligible to be regarded as individuals,
quite as much as particulars are. Furthermore, it would be a mistake to suppose that
all individuals are necessarily concrete entities, as opposed to abstract ones. Certain
mathematical entities, for instance, can be regarded as individuals. Consequently,
spatiotemporal and causal characterizations of individuality are inadequate, since they
lack the generality required to capture this notion.
Many philosophers assume, explicitly or implicitly, that all entities are individuals in
the foregoing sense, and indeed that it is a necessary truth that they are. But this can
certainly be disputed. It is, very arguably, both logically and metaphysically possible
for there to be non-individuals, that is, entities which fail to satisfy either clause (1) or
clause (2) — or both — of the foregoing definition of an ‘individual'. The aim of this
paper will be to clarify the notion of a non-individual, propose a typology of nonindividuals,
and illustrate the notion's potential for application within and across the
sciences, by means of putative examples. This is an enterprise in which analytic
metaphysics and theoretical science can, it is to be hoped, cooperate fruitfully and
without mutual hostility or rivalry, to the benefit of both.
