Philosophers of science have tended towards local, rather than global, treatments of individuality. This strategy has been fruitful, e.g., Michael Ghiselin and David Hull's individuality thesis has centrally shaped debates in philosophy of biology and meaningfully influenced biological practice. These deeply intertwined applications inform each other as biologists and philosophers refine their concepts of individuation and identity in light of each others' work. Expanding the discussion to include other philosophers and scientists is a gambit worth pursuing.

Below I re-articulate the Ghiselin-Hull individuality thesis in terms of three core commitments: the Parity, History, and Part/Whole theses. These commitments provide points of contact for a 'transversal comparison' of criteria and concepts of individuality across scientific and philosophical fields. For example, the history thesis specifies identity conditions for individuals in terms of ancestry, as opposed to possession of characters. A physics or metaphysics analog of this component may be constructed or generalized to consider against existing criteria in those fields. In this way, my approach helpfully clarifies the biological individuality thesis, while promoting dialogue among philosophers of science and metaphysicians working on individuality.