Anti-Haecceitism and Structuralism in Quantum Mechanics
1 : The University of Arizona
In this paper I consider a recent argument by Caulton and Butterfield that aims to motivate structuralism on the basis of anti-haecceitism in quantum mechanics (QM). I agree with the authors that QM does suggest both anti-haecceitism and structuralism, but I find their characterization of structuralism disappointing. Rather than explaining anti-haecceitism in a structure-based metaphysics of quantum particles, the authors merely identify the former thesis with structuralism.
I propose instead a stronger form of structuralism based on a discussion of spacetime substantivalism in general relativity (GR) by Richard Healey. The key to his approach in that context is to attribute essential location properties to spacetime points that block the possibility of rearranging the points to create a distinct world. Similarly, I propose that quantum particles have certain relational properties essentially. This structuralist metaphysics allows one to explain anti-haecceitism while serving as a explication of the idea that objects in modern physics are first and foremost elements of structure.
I propose instead a stronger form of structuralism based on a discussion of spacetime substantivalism in general relativity (GR) by Richard Healey. The key to his approach in that context is to attribute essential location properties to spacetime points that block the possibility of rearranging the points to create a distinct world. Similarly, I propose that quantum particles have certain relational properties essentially. This structuralist metaphysics allows one to explain anti-haecceitism while serving as a explication of the idea that objects in modern physics are first and foremost elements of structure.
